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Abstract
This paper explores the link between exports and the demand for skilled tasks. 
Using the Chilean Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual census of 
manufacturing firms, we first show that Chilean exporters utilize more skills than 
Chilean non-exporters. More importantly, we establish a distinct pattern of task 
differentiation among exporters both within skilled and unskilled tasks. Exporting 
firms demand the services of skilled specialized workers (engineers) as opposed to skilled 
administrative workers and managers. In addition, exporters demand less unskilled 
labor, especially blue-collar operatives. This suggests that exporters substitute skilled 
engineers for unskilled blue-collar workers to perform export-related tasks.
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1 Introduction
There is widespread evidence of both a wage and an employment premium at exporting 
vis-a-vis non-exporting firms (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard, Jensen, Redding and 
Schott, 2007). In the literature, a leading mechanism behind these premia is the skilled 
labor utilization of exports. The production of goods for export utilizes skilled labor because 
exporting requires activities such as quality upgrades and operational services that are 
both intensive in high-quality labor (Verhoogen 2008; Matsuyama 2007). The supporting 
literature is large and includes Bernard and Jensen (1997), Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto 
(2012), Brambilla and Porto (2016), Caron, Fally and Markusen (2014), Fieler, Eslava and 
Xu (2017), Munch and Skaksen (2008), Serti, Tomasi and Zanfei (2010), Soderbom and Teal 
(2000), Verhoogen (2008), Yeaple (2005).1 In this paper, we look within skills and explore 
the type of skilled tasks demanded by exporting firms in Chile. We investigate whether these 
firms hire higher skilled workers for all possible tasks or, rather, whether the utilization of 
skilled labor is concentrated on more specific tasks in production or non-production activities. 
The literature on differential impacts of exports across tasks is much more scant and is 
circumscribed to developed countries (Bernini, Guillou and Treibich 2016; Caliendo and 
Rossi-Hansberg 2012; Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg 2015; Caliendo, Mion, Opromolla 
and Rossi-Hansberg 2016; Friedrich 2016; Spanos 2016; Tag 2013).
To study the behavior of Chilean exporters, we use the Encuesta Nacional Industrial 
Anual (ENIA)—an annual census of manufacturing firms—and exploit detailed information 
of the firm demand of employment categories such as directors, specialized workers 
(engineers, professionals), administrators, blue-collar operatives, and maintenance services 
workers. The firm data from the ENIA is combined with administrative customs data on 
firms’ exports. This allows us to link the exporting status of a firm with the demand 
for skilled tasks and to track this link for several years. We show that Chilean exporters 
utilize more skills than Chilean non-exporters. However, the skill composition of employment 
matters. In particular, we show that exporters require the services of skilled specialized 
workers (engineers) as opposed to skilled administrative workers or managers. In addition, 
exporters demand less unskilled labor, especially blue-collar operatives. This suggests that 
exporters substitute skilled for unskilled labor in the provision of certain skill-intensive tasks 
used in production. We establish these results with an instrumental variable estimator, where 
we instrument the firm’s exports (as a share of total sales) with the weighted average of the 
changes in the exchange rate of all the firm’s international partners (Brambilla, Lederman, 
Porto 2012; Park, Yang, Shi and Jiang 2010; Verhoogen, 2008). We argue that our results 
thus estimated provide causal evidence of the skilled tasks demanded by exporters relative 
to non-exporters.
Our results contribute to a rather succinct literature on tasks utilized in exports. 
The theory on organizational structure and layers of employment launched by Caliendo 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) has been applied to French data (Caliendo, Monte and
1An extended versión of this mechanism is the “quality-complementarity” hypothesis. Exports require 
higher quality products that need to be produced with high-quality inputs (labor, intermediate inputs, 
machines) at high-productivity firms. See Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and Bastos, Silva and Verhoogen 
(2017).
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Rossi-Hansberg 2015; Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg 2017; Spanos 2016), Danish data 
(Friedrich 2016), Swedish data (Tag 2013), and Portuguese data (Caliendo, Mion, Opromolla 
and Rossi-Hansberg 2016). The only application for developing countries is Cruz, Bussolo, 
and Iacovone (2016), who study internal firm reorganization and export performance in 
Brazil. While Chile is at the low spectrum of developed countries, and it is therefore not a 
developing country, this experience and the evidence gathered here illustrate the possibilities 
that export opportunities offer for the demand of skills and tasks for developing countries 
down the road. Our paper is thus a contribution to this incipient empirical literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the data, we 
present a set of stylized facts on exports and the demand for skilled tasks and we perform 
a detailed formal regression analysis. In section 3, we discuss our results in terms of the 
theoretical literature. Section 4 discusses extensions and concludes.
2 Exporting Firms and The Demand for Skilled Tasks
In this section, we study the most salient facts concerning the link between exporting firms 
and the demand for skilled tasks in Chile. We first describe the data and present the basic 
correlations between skills, tasks, and exports. Next, we turn to a detailed causal empirical 
analysis based on instrumental variables regressions.
We use two sources of data, firm-level data and customs records. The firm-level data 
come from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA), an annual industrial census run 
by Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística that interviews all manufacturing plants with 10 
workers or more. The ENIA is a panel. The customs data provide administrative records on 
firm exports by destination. We manually matched both databases for the period 2001-2005. 
As a result, we built a 5-year panel database of Chilean manufacturing firms.
The data have several modules. The main module contains information on industry 
affiliation, ownership type, sales, exports, input use, imports of materials, workers and wages. 
Industry affiliation is defined at the 4-digit ISIC Revision 3 level, which totals 113 industries.
We are mostly interested in the employment information. The data on workers are 
presented at detailed categories, which allows us to explore the demand for different skills 
and tasks. To do this, we base our empirical analysis on recent models of international 
trade where goods are produced with tasks using assignment rules (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
2001; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Costinot and Vogel 2010). Production involves many 
different tasks, such as managing, accounting, clerical activities, design, packaging, logistics, 
sales representation, operational production, input control, monitoring, supervision, services. 
Tasks can be executed by workers with different skills. We argue that the most skill-intensive 
tasks, such as managing or directing, are typically filled with skilled workers. In turn, the 
most unskill-intensive tasks, such as cleaning services, are instead performed by unskilled 
workers. The remaining tasks, mostly involving production and design, can be done by either 
skilled or unskilled workers. This depends on factor prices as well as on firm characteristics 
such as productivity. Because of this, exporters and non-exporters may choose different skill 
employment composition even for similar tasks. For instance, a machine at an exporting 
firm may be operated by a skilled engineer, while the same task could instead be performed
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by an unskilled operative at a non-exporting firm.
From the detailed employment records of the ENIA, we define the following production 
activities or tasks: management (directors), administrative services (accountants, lawyers), 
production services (engineers, blue-collar workers), and general maintenance services 
(unskilled non-production workers). We define skills according to formal education. We 
assume that directors, accountants, lawyers, engineers comprise skilled labor (because 
these workers need to obtain a college degree). To enrich the analysis, we also define 
a highly-skilled group, which includes managers and engineers. Unskilled workers are 
blue-collar, non-specialized and general maintenance workers (assuming these type of 
workers typically have lower formal educational levels). Finally, we let production workers 
include engineers and blue-collar operatives, while non-production workers include managers, 
administrative workers and maintenance workers.
Table 1 presents some key summary statistics. We report the unconditional averages as 
well as averages for exporting firms and non-exporting firms. On average, 39% of workers 
in Chilean firms are skilled workers and 61% are unskilled workers. As expected, exporters 
utilize a higher share of skilled workers (41%) than non-exporters (39%). Exporters are much 
larger and they hire, on average, more workers in all skilled and unskilled categories than 
non-exporters. Production workers account for 73% of employment of all Chilean firms, 
but 70% of the employment of exporters. In addition, exporters employ more managers, 
engineers and administrative services workers than non-exporters. Employment of unskilled 
blue-collar workers is less, while maintenance employees are slightly more, among exporters. 
Finally, the average exporter ships around 32% of its sales abroad. Among all firms, exports 
accounts for only 5% of total firm sales.
2.1 Regression Analysis
We begin our empirical analysis with the following regression model
yijt =  7 Eijt +  j  (1)
where i indices firms, t, time, and j ,  an industry. Outcomes are denoted by yijt and export 
intensity (the ratio of exports to total sales) is E ijt. We add a control vector x, which 
includes firm level variables such as log total employment and initial conditions (initial sales) 
interacted with year dummies to account for firm-specific trends. The regression includes 
firm fixed effects, and industry-year effects, 0jt.
Results from OLS-FE models are presented in Table 2. In column 1, we show the basic 
correlation of log employment and export intensity (conditional only on firm fixed-effects 
and year-effects). In column 2, we add log employment to control for size. This means 
we compare firms of equal size, with different export intensity. As it can be seen in 
these models, the correlation between exports and highly-skilled and skilled employment 
is positive and statistically significant. The results show that a firm with 10 percentage 
points higher export intensity hires 1.9% more highly-skilled workers and 1.6% more skilled 
workers than a similar-size firm. Exporters tend to hire less unskilled labor, but this 
coefficient is weak statistically. Exports are positively correlated with both production and
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non-production employment (Panel B, column 1), but, conditional of total firm employment, 
these associations become statistically insignificant (Panel B, column 2).
These correlations may be driven by industry trends, such as industry-specific growth 
processes. To account for those trends, we add in column 3 interactions between year 
dummies and industry dummies. In column 4, we also add initial conditions, the level of log 
sales in 2001 interacted with year dummies, to account for firm-specific trends (Brambilla, 
Lederman, and Porto, 2012). In all these specifications, the results are robust and the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are stable across models.
In terms of employment categories (Panel C), we find that exporters hire more 
engineers and administrative service workers and hire less maintenance service workers than 
non-exporters. There is no statistically discernible difference in managerial and unskilled 
blue-collar employment.
While these correlations are very robust, they are still correlations, not necessarily causal 
effects. This is because, for instance, there might be omitted variables creating biases. More 
productive firms are, for example, more likely to export and, at the same time, to be more 
efficient in the use of skilled labor. There might also be measurement errors (Brambilla, 
Lederman, and Porto, 2012). To get to these causal effects, we instrument the variable E j t 
with the average firm-level bilateral exchange rate. This strategy follows Revenga (1992), 
Bastos, Silva and Verhoogen (2017), Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2012), Brambilla and 
Porto (2016), and Park, Yang, Shi and Jiang (2010), among others. Intuitively, the argument 
is that exogenous export opportunities for a firm are likely to arise when its foreign export 
markets expand and this will happen when exchange rate changes make Chilean exports 
relatively cheaper. Given these exogenous changes, a firm will be more likely to take 
advantage of these export opportunities if it is exposed to those markets. A  natural measure 
of destination exposure in this case is the share of a firm's exports to that destination in 
total firm sales. Access to the administrative customs records allows us to do this for the 
Chilean ENIA firms. Formally, we define the instrument z0 as
zijt =  Sdij ln rdt> (2)
d
where sdij is the share of exports of firm i (in industry j ) to export destination d at the initial 
time period (year 2001), and rdt is the bilateral exchange rate between Chile and country d 
at t. Hence, z0jt is a weighted average of the real exchange rate faced by Chilean exporters, 
where the firm-specific weights are the initial shares of exports in sales. As in Brambilla, 
Lederman and Porto (2012), we also interact z0 with initial firm sales (i.e., log sales in 2001) 
to include any firm advantages in profiting from export opportunities based on firm size. 
Averages for the value of these instruments are reported in panel E) of Table 1.2
The statistical validity of the instrument can be checked with first-stage results for the
2In all our specifications, we use both z0 and its interaction with initial sales as instruments. We do this 
to maintain consistency with the literature that utilizes a similar approach as ours. However, all the results 
in the paper remain unaltered by a specification that keeps only the average firm-level exchanger rate, z0, 
and drops the interaction with initial sales. These results are reported in an Online Appendix available at 
the authors' websites.
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same four specifications used in the OLS-FE model. The results are in Table 3. As it can be 
seen in this first stage, the instruments have a lot of explanatory power. Quantitatively, when 
Chilean exporters become, on average, less competitive in their export market destinations, 
they sell less abroad. Also, it is reassuring that the instruments easily satisfy the test 
of joint significance. Further, the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects (columns 1-4), 
industry-specific trends (columns 3-4) and firm-specific trends (column 4) makes the validity 
of the exclusion restrictions more credible (Bastos, Silva and Verhoogen 2017; Brambilla, 
Lederman and Porto 2012; Brambilla and Porto 2016).
Economically, the exclusion restriction holds only if the changes in exchange rates affect 
firm employment only via their effects on exports. In our case, this assumption may fail if 
firms differ in the use of imported inputs. In the literature, imported inputs are generally 
higher quality inputs that can work as substitutes (or complements) for skilled workers 
(Kugler and Verhoogen 2012; Fieler, Eslava and Xu 2017). If the use of imported inputs 
depends on the exchange rates, then part of the effect of the instrument can be transmitted 
to this channel rather than exclusively via exports. To account for this, we further control in 
columns 5 for the share of imported inputs used by each firm. This share is the ratio of the 
value of the imported intermediate inputs and the value of total expenditures in intermediate 
inputs. We find that this does not affect the mechanism captured by our instruments.3
The causal impacts of export intensity on employment are reported in Table 4. Results 
for the demand of skills are in Panel A. Conditional of firm-fixed effects, larger exporters 
demand more skilled workers (column 1). They also demand more highly-skilled workers. 
These effects are highly statistically significant. Higher exports are associated with lower 
unskilled labor employment, but this effect is not statistically significant. In column 2, 
we find that, conditional on size and firm fixed effects, firms that export a higher share 
of their total sales utilize more skilled (and also highly-skilled) workers, and less unskilled 
workers. Both effects are statistically significant. This implies that an exogenous increase 
in exports induces firms to specialize in skilled intensive activities and tasks. The results 
remain unaffected by the inclusion of industry- and firm-specific trends (columns 3 and 4) or 
by the intensity of use of imported inputs (column 5). In these regressions, however, there 
is no discernible causal impact of exports on production or non-production employment.
The composition of tasks is, in contrast, different, as we show in panel C. Among skilled 
tasks, exporters utilize significantly more engineers (specialized workers)—see columns 1 to 
5. Employment of specialized service workers tends to be higher but this is not statistically 
significant (especially conditional of size, columns 2 to 5). Among unskilled tasks, the bulk 
of the difference takes place among non-specialized blue-collar workers. Taken together, this 
suggests that exporters tend to utilize more specialized workers and engineers relative to 
blue-collar, lower skilled operatives.
To give some context to these estimates, we calculate the fraction of within firm 
employment growth that can be explained by increasing exports. On average, firm skilled 
employment increased by 0.65% during the sample period, 2001-2005. The intensity of
3Another reason why the exclusion restrictions may fail if exchange rates have direct effects on the 
valuation of quality and the demand for quality in partner countries. As in Verhoogen (2008) and Brambilla, 
Lederman and Porto (2012), we assume these potential effects are absent or are negligible in practice.
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exports grew, on average, by 0.36%. Using the estimated coefficient in column 5, 0.27, 
exports would cause skilled employment to grow by 0.10%. This means that export growth 
can account for about 15% of total firm skilled employment growth. These magnitudes 
appear sizeable. Similar calculations reveal that exports can account for a smaller fraction, 
about 3.6%, of the employment growth of engineers at the firm level. By contrast, while firm 
employment of unskilled workers increased by 2.2% during this period, exports contributed 
negatively, reducing employment but only slightly, by 0.1%.
As a robustness check, Table 5 reports results using shares of employment, instead of log 
employment. We confirm that the share of skilled (and highly-skilled) labor is statistically 
higher among exporters. Instead, the shares of production and non-production workers 
are not statistically different. The share of engineering employment is much higher among 
exports. This is compensated with lower shares of blue-collar employment, while the shares 
of all other types of employments are not statistically different.
The distinction between the demand for skilled labor and the demand for tasks raises 
an interesting question, namely whether the impacts of exports on the demand for skills 
depends on the occupational structure of the firm (Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg 
2015; Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg 2017). The argument is that the demand of 
skilled and unskilled labor (and production and non-production labor) may depend on 
whether firms already employ directors, engineers, and other types of workers. If a firm, 
for example, has a team of engineers in its workforce, it may need to expand the demand 
for skilled labor differently when facing an export shock. To explore this, we measure the 
occupational structure with the shares of employment of different categories and we run 
regressions of the demand for skills (in log levels) conditional on this occupational structure. 
Results are in Table 6. In column 1, we control for firm and year fixed effects, industry-specific 
trends and firm-specific trends, we include a vector of employment shares but we omit firm 
size (total employment). We find that in response to higher exports, firms with similar 
occupational structure expand skilled employment (and high-skilled employment as well, 
but marginally so). There is, however, no effect on unskilled labor employment. When we 
condition on firm employment as well (in column 2), the results show that firms of similar 
size and similar occupational structure only expand skilled employment, with no response of 
both highly-skilled or unskilled employment. This can happen because larger exporting firms 
respond more at the upper tiers of skilled employment than smaller firms (Caliendo, Monte 
and Rossi-Hansberg 2015; Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg 2017). For robustness, we 
check whether these findings depend on the use of imported inputs, again because of possible 
complementarities or substitutabilities. Results in columns 3 and 4 show that our estimates 
are robust to this specification.
To end our analysis, we explore in what follows separate responses on the extensive and 
intensive margins. So far, we have measured exposure with the intensity of exports, the 
ratio of exports to sales. This includes responses of both exporters that increase their sales 
abroad and non-exporters that begin to export. To study the extensive margin, we re-do our 
analysis and replace the exporter intensity variables with an exporter dummy. With a panel, 
this strategy captures the role of transitions into and out of exporting on employment. Table 
7 shows results for our basic five specifications. The same patterns emerge. An exporter, for 
instance, hires more highly-skilled and skilled workers than a non-exporter. The magnitudes
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are large: skilled employment, for instance, is 44% higher at an exporting firm. Conditional 
on total employment, unskilled labor is much lower, 57%, at exporters. This shows that 
exporting firms do employ more skills and sometimes at the expense of unskilled workers, 
a result that is consistent with the observation that exporters utilize higher quality inputs, 
including higher quality labor (Verhoogen 2008; Bastos, Silva and Verhoogen 2017). In 
Panel C), we confirm that these patterns also translate to the employment of skilled tasks 
found before. In particular, exporters hire more engineers and less blue-collar workers than 
non-exporters. Becoming an exporter requires the set up a large tier of skilled workers, 
essentially engineers, while in closing export operations the re-structuring of firms involves 
higher employment of unskilled workers, mostly blue-collar.
To focus exclusively on the intensive margin, we run all these regressions using only firms 
with positive exports. The results are reported in Table 8. As expected, since we are now 
ignoring the extensive margin, the estimated impacts are somewhat milder but the overall 
qualitative conclusions are still observed. In particular, increasing the export intensity is 
associated with an expansion of skilled employment, especially of engineers. It is noteworthy 
that the reduction of blue-collar employment is not statistically significant. This suggests 
that the substitution of blue-collar workers for engineers is more prevalent among firms that 
become exporters rather than on active exporting firms.
3 Discussion and Theoretical Mechanisms
We can think about our empirical results as providing evidence on two related, but 
different, features of exporting firms. We establish that exporters demand higher skills than 
non-exporters. We also show that exporting firms choose a different composition of skilled 
employment, hiring more engineers at the expense of blue-collar workers. These observations 
have implications for theories of exports and employment. While our results confirm the link 
between exports and skills, they also suggest a role for tasks differentiation in exports. In 
particular, our evidence suggests specific skills that are demanded for exporters, namely 
the skills of specialized operatives such as engineers rather than specialized administrative 
workers. Furthermore, these engineers replace unspecialized blue-collar workers, rather than 
maintenance or services workers. As a consequence, the differentiation of tasks for exports 
has implications for both the demand of skilled and unskilled tasks. In what follows, we 
review the literature to document theories that can help rationalize these results.
The link between exports and the demand of skilled labor belongs to a larger literature 
that links exports to the demand of high quality inputs more generally. Supporting evidence 
can be found in Verhoogen (2008), Manova and Zhang (2012), Brambilla, Lederman and 
Porto (2012), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Bastos, Silva and Verhoogen (2017), Fieler, 
Eslava and Xu (2017), among others. To explain how this link works, the literature has 
offered several interpretations. In all these interpretations, there is a distinct feature of the 
act of exporting that plays a role.
A strand of literature emphasizes the role of the valuation of quality in export markets. 
Hallak (2006), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson (2012) show a positive correlation 
between export unit values and the level of income of the country of destination; Manova and
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Zhang (2012), Bastos and Silva (2010), and Gorg, Halpern and Murakozy (2010) show that 
exporting firms charge higher prices in export markets. Quality valuation matters because if 
firms want to exploit export opportunities, then they may need to upgrade the quality of their 
products. The link to skilled utilization is a technological issue and the literature assumes 
that the provision of quality is inherently a skilled intensive activity. Evidence in support of 
this assumption can be found in Schott (2004), who reports higher U.S. import unit values 
for varieties originating in capital- and skill-abundant countries, and Hummels and Klenow 
(2005), who show that these unit values also positively correlate with the per capita income 
of the exporting country. Similarly, Caron, Fally, and Markusen (2014) establish a positive 
correlation between the income elasticity of a good and its skilled-labor intensity. Using 
cross-country data, Brambilla and Porto (2016) show that both the quality valuation and 
the quality provision mechanisms operate, on average, worldwide for a panel of 82 countries.
A different interpretation is provided by Matsuyama (2007) and Brambilla, Lederman, 
and Porto (2012). Their argument is that exports require a set of specific activities, such 
as international marketing and commercialization, transportation and distribution, and 
advertising that are inherently skilled intensive. As a result, reaching export markets is 
associated with a higher skilled labor utilization. Evidence in support of this “required 
services” argument is in Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2012).
To tell apart the quality mechanism from the required services mechanism, we combine 
the regression specification in previous sections with ideas from Brambilla and Porto (2016). 
Following this approach, we construct a measure of the average per capita GDP of the 
destination of a firms’ exports, using destination export shares as weights. Assuming that 
high income countries demand higher quality products, this variable captures the quality 
mechanism. The intensity of exports (the ratio of exports over sales) can capture the residual 
impact of the required services mechanism. We present the results in Table 9. To simplify 
the exposition, we run the most comprehensive specification where the control for firm and 
year fixed-effects, employment, firm-specific trends and the share of imported inputs. As in 
Brambilla and Porto (2016), we instrument the average per capita GDP of a firms’ destination 
with the average partner country per capita GDP using bilateral real exchange rates as 
weights. To see how this works, consider a scenario where conditions induce firms to shift 
exports from a low income to a high income country and to sell products of higher quality. 
The value of the average firm-level per capita GDP of destinations should increase and 
the demand for skills should also increase in response to the quality mechanism. Thus, 
the instrument in effect captures arguably exogenous changes in exports shares to different 
destinations GDP. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 9, we report the estimated impacts of export 
intensity and of the average per capita GDP for different skill employment and different tasks. 
Regarding export intensity, all our previous results persist. In particular, we find positive 
impacts on skilled employment relative to unskilled employment, and positive impacts on 
engineers relative to blue-collar workers. Interestingly, similar patterns emerge in response to 
increases in the average per capita GDP of a firm’s export destinations. In column 2, we see 
that skilled employment increases while unskilled employment decreases. Furthermore, the 
demand for engineers goes up and the demand for blue-collar workers goes down, as before. 
In columns 3 and 4, we explore results for the extensive margin. Concretely, we include a 
dummy variable for exporting in general, as in Table 7, and we add a dummy variable for
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firms exporting to high-income countries—a dummy that takes a value of one when a firm 
exports to a country at the top 25% of the per capita GDP spectrum. As it can be seen, 
the results are qualitatively similar as before. Exporting is associated with higher skilled 
employment and in particular higher utilization of engineers, and there is an additional 
effect on the demand of skills and of skilled tasks for firms that export to high-income, rich 
countries.
These results suggests that both the quality and the required services mechanisms are 
present in the Chilean case. The presence of the quality mechanism is consistent with the 
widespread support for it listed above. The presence of the required services mechanism is 
also expected. Pellandra (2017), for instance, finds support for the Matsuyama interpretation 
using similar Chilean data. Building on Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2012), Pellandra 
includes fixed costs of reaching different export destinations and those fixed costs are 
essentially covered with skilled workers. This suggests that the required services mechanism 
is also present. Incidentally, this is consistent with the results in Brambilla, Lederman, and 
Porto (2012), who also find support for both mechanisms using Argentine data.
The most novel result of this paper is, however, the finding that exporting requires 
the skills of specific tasks within skilled labor, namely those performed by engineers 
rather than by directors or administrative workers. The quality provision and quality 
valuation mechanisms just discussed can rationalize these findings by assuming for example 
a technology to produce quality that is more intensive in those specific skilled tasks. In the 
working paper version of this paper (Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto 2016), we develop a 
model with some of these features. We combine elements from the literature on quality and 
skilled utilization with element from theories of trade and tasks. In particular, we build on 
recent models of international trade where goods are produced with tasks using assignment 
rules (Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Costinot and Vogel 2010). Production involves many 
different tasks, such as managing, accounting, clerical activities, design, packaging, logistics, 
sales representation, operational production, input control, monitoring, supervision, services. 
Tasks are executed by workers with different skills, some tasks are skill-intensive, while 
others are unskilled-intensive. Firms produce goods of varying quality and exporters tend 
to produce higher quality goods. In turn, the production of quality is intensive in skilled 
tasks relative to the production of physical output. Firms are heterogeneous and differ in the 
efficiency of factor use: some firms are more productive in skill-intensive tasks than others. 
More productive firms become exporters and hire more skilled workers overall. The demand 
for skilled workers will, however, be biased towards those skilled tasks required to produce 
exportable higher-quality goods.
A different strand of literature that is related to our results on tasks builds on the 
organizational structure of firms and their export orientation. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) 
argue that export opportunities induce firms to reorganize and adopt better technologies, 
thus becoming more productive. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) develop a theory of 
firms that choose layers of employees to organize production in the most efficient, less costly 
way. In this theory, the bottom layer (blue-collar workers) produces output while consecutive 
upper layers (supervisors, management) solve problems associated with production. Adding 
a layer of “problem solving” reduces the marginal cost of production but incurs a fixed cost. 
Consequently, a demand shock (such as an export shock in our empirical analysis) may
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(or may not) induce firms to reorganize production, adding layers and increasing overall 
productivity. Empirical evidence related to this theory can be found in Tag (2013), Bernini, 
Guillou and Treibich (2016), Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), Caliendo, Monte 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2017), Caliendo, Mion, Opromolla and Rossi-Hansberg (2016), Cruz, 
Bussolo and Iacovone (2016), Friedrich (2016) and Spanos (2016).
Our results for Chile can be rationalized by this theory. The lower layer of production 
would include the non-specialized blue-collar workers. Engineers supervise blue-collar 
workers and, plausibly, can work in production as well. Exposed to increases in export 
opportunities, firms reorganize their structure by expanding the layer of engineers needed to 
supervise blue-collar workers (and, again, possibly to substitute some of them in production 
as well). This would explain why exporters demand more skilled tasks and, in turn, why 
the utilization of engineers increases more than the utilization of directors or administrative 
skilled workers. These impacts may be particularly large at the extensive margin. In this 
context, our paper contributes to this literature by providing evidence of these mechanisms 
using less detailed data for lower developed or advanced middle-income countries rather than 
the employer-employee datasets used in the studies referenced above. This can shed light on 
the role of exporting and employment in relatively more advanced developing countries.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the link between exports and the demand for skilled tasks 
using a panel of Chilean firms. We have found that exporting raises the demand for specific 
sets of skills, favoring technical skills such as engineering skills over other profession skills 
such as “desk” skills. In addition, engineers seem to replace blue-collar unskilled labor in 
certain tasks associated with exporting.
Our findings have implications for trade theory and should illustrate the importance 
of recent assignment models of factors to tasks in international trade. The results have 
implications for empirical research and policy design as well. The notion that trade, 
and exports in particular, affects the wage premium and thus wage-inequality needs to 
be carefully assessed. Our results should contribute to our understanding of the skilled 
tasks needed to exports, the role of potential education policies consistent with a successful 
long-run export performance (e.g., fostering technical careers), and the design of social 
policies to reduce wage inequality and help the losers from trade. Finally, we have provided 
evidence on the link between trade and the employment structure of exporting firm in Chile, 
which is useful to illustrate the interplay between exports, firm reorganization, and efficiency 
at the firm level in middle-income/developing countries.
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TABLE  1
Summary statistics
National Annual Industrial Survey
Chile 2001 - 2005
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor 
skilled employment 
highly-skilled employment 
unskilled employment 
share skilled employment 
share highly-skilled employment 
share unskilled employment
B) Production and Non-Production Labor 
share production employment
share non-production employment
C) Tasks
share managerial employment 
share engineering employment 
share services employment 
share blue-collar employment 
share maintenance employment
D) Exports 
exports/sales
E) Instruments 
exchange rate 
exchange rate * sales
All Firms Exporters Non-Exporters
28.09 76.20 18.35
19.83 51.72 13.31
56.33 142.04 38.96
38.69 40.62 38.53
25.95 26.79 25.88
61.31 59.38 61.47
73.21 70.15 73.47
26.79 29.85 26.53
7.17 8.68 7.04
18.78 18.11 18.84
12.74 13.84 12.65
54.42 52.04 54.63
6.88 7.33 6.85
0.05 0.32 0.00
-0.19 -1.11 0.00
-2.81 -16.23 0.00
SOURCE: averages calculated from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial 
Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  2
The demand for tasks and exports
(log employment)
OLS-FE
export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor
log highly-skilled 0.33*** 0.19*** 0.19** 0.19***
(0.087) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
log skilled 0.31*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.074) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
log unskilled 0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
(0 .101) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor
log production 0.27*** 0.00 0.009 0.009
(0.073) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
log non-production 0.14** 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.056) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
C) Tasks
log managers 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
log engineers 0.37*** 0 .22** 0 .22** 0 .22**
(0.103) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
log services 0.29*** 0.16** 0.15** 0.15**
(0.083) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069)
log blue-collar 0.14 - 0.11 - 0.11 - 0.11
(0 .111) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
log maintenance -0.15* - 0 .20*** - 0 .20*** - 0 .20***
(0.080) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment No Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes
firm-specific trends No No No Yes
NOTES: OLS-FE  regressions of (log) employment on export intensity (exports/sales). Column (1): firm 
fixed-effects and year fixed-effects; column (2): adds log total employment (firm size); column (3): adds controls 
for industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between year dummies and industry dummies); column (4): adds 
initial conditions to control for firm-specific trends. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual 
(National Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  3
First stage results
(exports /sales on z0)
export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
exchange rate -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.150***
(4) (0.023) (0.023) (0 .022) (0 .022) (0 .022)
exchange rate * initial sales -0.0029* -0.0030* -0.0029* -0.0029* -0.0029*
(4 * s?'0) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
R 2 0.4129 0.4147 0.4144 0.4146 0.4165
F  -statistic 888.09 882.96 888.42 884.31 884.60
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment No Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
firm-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
imported inputs No No No No Yes
NOTES: First-stage results of IV-FE  regressions of (log) employment (for various types of skilled and unskilled 
workers) on export intensity (exports/sales). Column (1): firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects; column (2): adds 
log total employment (firm size); column (3): adds controls for industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between 
year dummies and industry dummies); column (4): adds initial conditions to control for firm-specific trends; column 
(5): adds the share of imported inputs. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual 
Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  4
The demand for tasks and exports
(log employment)
IV-FE
export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor
log highly-skilled 0 .41*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(0.136) (0 .110) (0 .111) (0 .111) (0 .112)
log skilled 0.38*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.115) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
log unskilled - 0.20 -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor
log production 0 .20** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.097) (0.018) (0 .020) (0 .020) (0 .020)
log non-production 0.07 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01
(0.067) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
C) Tasks
log managers -0.08 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
(0.114) (0.105) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104)
log engineers 0.52*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.165) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139)
log services 0.25** 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14
(0 .122) (0 .112) (0 .111) (0 .111) (0 .111)
log blue-collar - 0.20 -0.37** -0.37** -0.36** -0.36**
(0.147) (0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
log maintenance -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
(0 .112) (0.114) (0.113) (0 .112) (0 .112)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226 5226
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment No Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
firm-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
imported inputs No No No No Yes
NOTES: IV-FE  regressions of (log) employment on export intensity (exports/sales). The instruments are the weighted 
average the real exchange rate of a firm export partners and the weighted average of the real gdp of a firm export destinations. 
Column (1): firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects; column (2): adds log total employment (firm size); column (3): adds 
controls for industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between year dummies and industry dummies); column (4): adds initial 
conditions to control for firm-specific trends; column (5): adds the share of imported inputs. Data are from the Encuesta 
Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  5
The demand for tasks and exports
(shares of employment)
IV-FE
export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor 
share highly-skilled 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
share skilled 0.08** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor 
share production 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0 .012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
C) Tasks
share managers - 0 .01** - 0.01 - 0.01 -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
share engineers 0.09*** 0 .10*** 0 .10*** 0 .10*** 0.09***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
share services -0.009 0.009 0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
share blue-collar -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08**
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
share maintenance - 0 .01** - 0 .01* - 0 .01* - 0 .01* - 0 .01*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226 5226
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment No Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
firm-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
imported inputs No No No No Yes
NOTES: IV-FE  regressions of log employment and employment shares on export intensity (exports/sales). The 
instruments are the weighted average of the real exchange rate of a firm export partners, z0, and its interaction with 
initial sales (in 2001). Column (1): firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects; column (2): adds log total employment 
(firm size); column (3): adds controls for industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between year dummies and industry 
dummies); column (4): adds initial conditions to control for firm-specific trends; column (5): adds the share of imported 
inputs. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
19
TABLE  6
The demand for tasks and exports 
Occupational structure 
(log employment)
IV-FE
export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor
log highly-skilled 0.13* 0.05 0.13* 0.05
(0.072) (0.045) (0.073) (0.046)
log skilled 0.16** 0.07** 0.16** 0.07**
(0.069) (0.030) (0.069) (0.030)
log unskilled -0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.09
(0.075) (0.057) (0.075) (0.057)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor
log production 0.10 -0.00 0.10 -0.00
(0.072) (0 .011) (0.072) (0 .011)
log non-production 0 .12* 0.03 0 .12* 0.03
(0.071) (0.032) (0.071) (0.032)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226
log employment No Yes No Yes
occupational structure Yes Yes Yes Yes
imported inputs No No Yes Yes
NOTES: IV-FE  regressions of (log) employment on export intensity (exports/sales). The instruments 
are the weighted average of the real exchange rate of a firm export partners, z0, and its interaction with 
initial sales (in 2001). Columns (1) and (3): controls for occupational structure measured with a vector 
of employment shares by task; columns (2) and (4): add log total employment (firm size); column (3) and 
(4): add the share of imported inputs. All regressions include firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects; 
industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between year dummies and industry dummies); firm-specific 
trends. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial Survey), 
Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  7
The demand for tasks and exports 
Exporter dummy 
(log employment)
exporter dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor 
log highly-skilled 0.67*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53***
(0.238) (0.197) (0.198) (0.199) (0.197)
log skilled 0.61*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.196) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.146)
log unskilled -0.32 -0.58*** -0.58** -0.58** -0.57**
(0.219) (0.225) (0.227) (0.227) (0.226)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor 
log production 0.32** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.161) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
log non-production 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.104) (0.081) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080)
C) Tasks
log managers -0.13 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20
(0.185) (0.174) (0.174) (0.174) (0.173)
log engineers 0.84*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0 .68***
(0.291) (0.248) (0.249) (0.250) (0.248)
log services 0.40** 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.22
(0.185) (0.174) (0.172) (0.175) (0.174)
log blue-collar -0.33 -0.61** -0.60** -0.60** -0.59**
(0.240) (0.249) (0.251) (0.251) (0.250)
log maintenance -0.08 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14
(0.183) (0.186) (0.185) (0.185) (0.184)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226 5226
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment No Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
firm-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
imported inputs No No No No Yes
NOTES: IV-FE  regressions of (log) employment on an exporter dummy. Column (1): firm fixed-effects and year
fixed-effects; column (2): adds log total employment (firm size); column (3): adds controls for industry-specific trends (i.e., 
interactions between year dummies and industry dummies); column (4): adds initial conditions to control for firm-specific 
trends; column (5): adds the share of imported inputs. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National 
Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  8
The demand for tasks and exports 
Only exporters 
(log employment)
export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor 
log highly-skilled 0.37** 0.26** 0.25* 0.24* 0.25*
(0.170) (0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.131)
log skilled 0.30** 0.19* 0.18* 0.17* 0.18*
(0.146) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102)
log unskilled -0.09 -0.24 -0.23 -0.23 -0.24
(0.144) (0.152) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor 
log production 0.22* 0.04 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.121) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
log non-production -0.01 -0.09* -0.09* -0.10* -0.10*
(0.079) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
C) Tasks
log managers -0.17 -0.23* -0.22* -0.23* -0.22*
(0.145) (0.131) (0.130) (0.128) (0.128)
log engineers 0.47** 0.35** 0.35** 0.34** 0.35**
(0.208) (0.164) (0.166) (0.168) (0.168)
log services 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
(0.117) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097)
log blue-collar -0.08 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23
(0.158) (0.169) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168)
log maintenance -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
(0.130) (0.132) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226 5226
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment No Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
firm-specific trends No No No Yes Yes
imported inputs No No No No Yes
NOTES: IV-FE  regressions of (log) employment on export intensity (exports/sales) only for exporting firms (the intensive 
margin). Column (1): firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects; column (2): adds log total employment (firm size); column
(3) : adds controls for industry-specific trends (i.e., interactions between year dummies and industry dummies); column
(4) : adds initial conditions to control for firm-specific trends; column (5): adds the share of imported inputs. Data are 
from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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TABLE  9
The demand for tasks, exports and export destinations
(log employment)
IV-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
export average per exporter high-income
intensity capita GDP dummy exporter dummy
A) Skilled and Unskilled Labor
log highly-skilled 0.33*** 0.15*** 0.53*** 1.91***
(0 .111) (0.055) (0.197) (0.619)
log skilled 0.27*** 0 .12** 0.44*** 1.56***
(0.085) (0.050) (0.146) (0.556)
log unskilled -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.57** -3.95***
(0.136) (0.041) (0.226) (0.461)
B) Production and Non-Production Labor
log production 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15
(0 .020) (0.017) (0.034) (0.175)
log non-production -0.02 -0.09* -0.02 -0.95**
(0.048) (0.046) (0.080) (0.466)
C) Tasks
log managers -0.13 -0.01 -0.20 -0.21
(0.104) (0.043) (0.173) (0.486)
log engineers 0.43*** 0.15** 0 .68*** 2.08***
(0.139) (0.064) (0.248) (0.716)
log services 0.13 -0.18*** 0.22 -1.68***
(0 .111) (0.060) (0.174) (0.603)
log blue-collar -0.37** -0.38*** -0.60** -4.37***
(0.151) (0.046) (0.250) (0.516)
log maintenance -0.09 0.07 -0.14 0.63
(0 .112) (0.066) (0.184) (0.728)
N 20544 20544 20544 20544
Firms 5226 5226 5226 5226
firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
log employment Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
firm-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
imported inputs Yes Yes Yes Yes
NOTES: IV-FE  regressions of (log) employment on export intensity (exports/sales) and the average per capita GDP of a 
firm’ export destination. Columns (1): estimates of export intensity; column (2): estimates of average per capita GDP; 
column (3): estimates of an export dummy; column (4): estimates of a high-income export dummy. All regression include 
firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects, log total employment (firm size), firm-specific trends, and the share of imported 
inputs. Data are from the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (National Annual Industrial Survey), Chile 2001-2005.
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